Prince Konoye and his supporters 3.pri.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

With the celebration of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, the situation had become more critical than ever. Though a movement was underway in Japan to strengthen the Axis faction, and, consequently, opposition toward any adjustment with the United States was increasing, yet the advocates of anti-Americanism had not weakened the power of the present government.[381]

Nevertheless, in order to achieve a successful understanding, it would be necessary to produce quicker and better results and, perhaps, even to publish them. When once the date for an interview between the leaders of the two countries had been established or definite negotiations were underway, Foreign Minister Toyoda was certain that the people would stand united and that all opposition would be quickly overcome. However, at the present time Japan was disturbed concerning the delay in receiving a definite answer from the United States to the proposal submitted by Prince Konoye over a month before.

Because an influential Admiral and one General would be included in Prime Minister Konoye's entourage, the Japanese government feared that the United States might suspect it was controlled by military elements. Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to dispel this illusion. In speaking with British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, who had stated that the United States "lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan", Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to eliminate American suspicion by pointing out the trustworthiness of Prime Minister Konoye and the complete reliability of the present Japanese government.[382]

92. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Changes in the Japanese Proposals (September 27, 1941)

On September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that he had dispatched Mr. Matsudaira to deliver to Mr. Ballantine the English text of Japan's explanation for maintaining troops in China after the restoration of peace and[383] also the text indicating the Japanese government's final efforts to make arrangements for a conference between the leaders of the governments.

Expressing his opinion on various points of Admiral Toyoda's message, Ambassador Nomura believed that since the United States insisted upon coming to an agreement on all the points involved before considering the proposed leaders' conference, Japan could do no more than await an expression of the intentions of the United States since it had already clarified thoroughly its position.[384]

If further Japanese proposals were submitted before receiving a definite reply from America, matters would only be further complicated and the progress of negotiations possibly hampered because any inconsistencies appearing in the new proposals would cause the United States to doubt Japan's sincerity.

Ambassador Nomura had noted a definite desire on the part of the United States to conduct negotiations along the lines of its proposals submitted on June 21, 1941, which, in the Japanese Ambassador's opinion were concrete and extremely practicable. He suggested therefore, that his government accept the reasonings embodied therein.

Turning to a discussion of phrases contained in the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura remarked that certain of them would cause a setback in the present negotiations. For example, if the item "no northward advance shall be made without justification" were deleted at this time, the American government would become suspicious of Japan's motives.

[381] III, 217.
[382] III, 218.
[383] Mr. Terasaki presented Japan's reasons for maintaining troops in China to Mr. Dooman on September 23, 1941. See S.D., II, 640. Foreign Minister Toyoda in a message to Mr. Koshi on September 23, 1941 ordered that a copy of this document be delivered to Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura delayed until September 27, 1941 before complying with this order.
[384] III, 219.

[82]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

With respect to the attitudes of both nations toward the war in Europe, Ambassador Nomura believed the United States would find it exceedingly difficult to conform to Japan's proposal for joint mediation in bringing about world peace. The recent sinking of the American destroyer Greer by a German submarine had affected public opinion greatly. Therefore, it would be exceedingly difficult to secure complete agreement with the United States regarding the European war.

Ambassador Nomura commented that since all moves of America toward aiding the Allies were based on the desire to maintain its own national defense, even if it became actively involved in the conflict and even though provided with ample provocation to do so, America would probably not make any aggressive attack. By making the term "right to self-defense" as elastic as possible, the United States hoped to obviate the necessity of Japan's invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Consequently, the outline of Japan's needs for self-defense, which appeared in the proposals, might easily arouse America's suspicions.

Fearing that no real negotiations could be entered into with the United States unless an agreement had been reached on the matter of garrisoning troops in China and extending a guarantee of nondiscrimination in this area, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that in the final analysis Japan would be forced to accept the terms offered by the United States insofar as they did not conflict with the existing Nanking Agreement.

Though the "nondiscrimination" phrase was not so important as the questions surrounding the stationing of Japanese troops in China, Ambassador Nomura believed that several negotiations would have to be conducted with the United States before America would yield to any proposal. Furthermore, he felt that the United States would not be satisfied with Japan's assurance that no third nation would be discriminated against in China as long as it conducted economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, nor did it seem likely that the United States would permit Japan to exercise such privileges in China as were in conformity with "the principle of especially close relations".

Since the United States desired to publicize any understanding reached, Ambassador Nomura saw little possibility for Japan's success in having the United States and Japan held jointly responsible for the settlement of the China Incident. Since President Roosevelt was very interested in mediating the Japanese-Chinese question Ambassador Nomura thought that the United States would raise some question regarding the term "Konoye's statement and those agreements between Japan and China". In order to offset the possibility of any difficulty arising from this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the word "President" be inserted in the phrase.

Since it had been rumored that Secretary Hull had written the part of the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941 pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura suggested that his government retain that portion of the proposal as a diplomatic gesture.

Furthermore, since he was certain that the new proposals would be more acceptable to the United States if they dealt solely with a large scale peace in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura requested a deletion of that part of the agreement which referred to the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China only upon the termination of the China Incident.[385]

93. Ambassador Grew Appraises Conditions in Japan (September 29, 1941)

In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, Ambassador Grew attempted to appraise conditions in Japan pertaining to the current diplomatic situation.[386] The

[385] Ibid.
[386] "Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 645-650.

[83]

American Ambassador believed that since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July 1940, American diplomacy had not been in a better position to effect a Japanese-American rapprochement than it now held under the Konoye-Toyoda regime. Since the time was so propitious the American Ambassador hoped that an enduring foundation for friendly relations between the two countries would be established. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew was aware that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the prevention of further Japanese advances in the Pacific would be extremely difficult for any Japanese Minister to settle satisfactorily because of domestic opposition.

Since he believed that only respect for America's potential power had deterred Japan from taking more liberties with United States' interests, Ambassador Grew expressed the opinion that Tokyo's program of forceful expansion could be halted only by a threat to use this power, if necessary. By such action, a regeneration of Japanese thought might take place which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States. This American policy had already aided in discrediting former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

At the present time, Japan was attempting to correct its miscalculation in signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in order to avoid the peril of being caught between Russia and the United States. With the advent of the German-Russian war, however, there was now every chance that the liberal elements in Japan would become more prominent in the attempt to extricate Japan from a dangerous position. By forbearance, patient argumentation and open declaration of the determination of the United States to take positive measures whenever they were called for, Ambassador Grew believed that the anticipated regeneration of Japanese-American relations could be effected.

The opinion was being circulated in certain circles of the United States government that an agreement between Japan and the United States would free the Japanese from the threat of America's aid to China, thereby allowing Japan to strengthen its forces for further aggression in China and throughout the Pacific. In addition, this same group held the opinion that when a deterioration in Japanese domestic economy occurred as a result of commercial restrictions exercised by the United Nations, Japan would be forced to relinquish its aggressive policies.

According to Ambassador Grew, the United States had the choice of two methods in dealing with Japan; one was the use of progressive economic strangulation, the other, constructive conciliation. From the trend of the informal conversations at Washington, it was evident that America had chosen the latter course. Should this method fail, the application of stronger economic restrictions could always be effected. Whatever the trend of Japanese-American relations were in the future, however, the United States would have to remain in a state of preparedness.

Ambassador Grew felt that the principal point at issue was not whether Japan would halt its expansionist program but when. If the United States were to lose the present opportunity to end Japan's program of forceful aggression, the prospect of war was not impossible. Recalling the cases of the Maine and the Panay, Ambassador Grew stated that war could quite possibly result from some incident arousing public opinion.

Ambassador Grew stressed the importance of understanding Japanese psychology since Japan's reactions to any circumstances could not be predicted according to Western standards. Were the United States to wait for the Japanese government to set forth, in concrete detail, commitments which would satisfy the American government, the conversations would be prolonged indefinitely. As a result the Konoye Cabinet and the elements supporting rapprochement with the United States would lose favor, and because of the abnormal sensitiveness of the Japanese and the effects of loss of face, the reaction against America would be serious. Such a situation would be even more serious than a failure to reach a complete agreement at a leaders' conference.

Ambassador Grew had been informed confidentially that the Japanese government found it impossible to clarify further its policies prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting

[84]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

because former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had recounted the complete details of the Washington negotiations to the German Ambassador in Japan, and many of Mr. Matsuoka's supporters who were still in the Tokyo Foreign Office would be in a position to reveal information to German and Japanese extremists who render the present Cabinet's position untenable. However, Prince Konoye had promised to make commitments in his meeting with President Roosevelt that would satisfy the United States, and although unable to determine the exact truth of this statement, Ambassador Grew pointed out that Tokyo had shown a readiness to reduce its alliance with the Axis powers to a dead letter by initiating negotiations with the United States. He suggested, therefore, that the United States place a reasonable amount of confidence in the professed sincere intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters. As an alternative to discrediting the Japanese military powers through actual military defeat, America should attempt to regenerate Japanese thought by constructive conciliation along the lines of its present efforts.[387]

94. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 29, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[388] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

To deliver a document containing the gist of the meeting between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 29, 1941.[389] The Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to press for a definite answer to the Japanese proposal, but since he was well aware of the American government's opinion regarding this matter and had already passed that information on to his own government, he was somewhat embarrassed. He also explained that he had been requested to obtain an interview with President Roosevelt, but in view of the present situation he would like to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Secretary Hull replied that he had been out of direct touch with the President for the past three or four days, owing to the death of President Roosevelt's brother-in-law. Nevertheless, he expected to be able to give the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum concerning the proposals of the Japanese government in a short time, since he planned to see President Roosevelt that day.

Secretary Hull then declared that some delay had been necessary to permit Japan to educate its people to accept the program advocated by the United States. Ambassador Nomura explained that there were certain groups within the Japanese army which wondered why the United States, asserting leadership on the American continent because of the Monroe Doctrine, was interfering with Japan's assumption of leadership throughout Asia.

When asked if the Japanese public as a whole desired an immediate settlement of the China conflict, Ambassador Nomura replied in the affirmative but remarked that under existing circumstances they had no other alternative but to continue fighting. Ambassador Nomura agreed with Secretary Hull that many of the Japanese occupation forces would not wish to be recalled.

[387] Ibid.
[388] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 651-652.
[389] "Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to Secretary of State (Hull)", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654. The text to of this same oral statement was conveyed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda, see S.D., II, 641-645. For the text wired to Ambassador Nomura by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27, 1941, see III, 215.

[85]

Although certain that the Konoye government was in a strong position, Ambassador Nomura believed that if Prime Minister Konoye failed to achieve a meeting between the chiefs of the two governments, he would be succeeded by a less moderate leader.[390]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[391]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo on September 29, 1941 that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull that morning to speak of Foreign Minister Toyoda's conference with Ambassador Grew, to urge again that early action be taken on the leaders' conference, and to request that he be permitted to see President Roosevelt.

Because of the death of a relative, President Roosevelt had been away for a time, but Secretary Hull assured the Japanese Ambassador that within a few days a memorandum would be issued to him by the United States.

Thoroughly familiar with Ambassador Grew's report on the meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda in Tokyo, Secretary Hull was convinced that the need for immediate action was evident, but he believed that unity of public opinion in Japan was of primary importance. Stating that Japanese public opinion could never be made to conform to every whim of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese people could not understand why the United States, which always appealed to the Monroe Doctrine after seizing leadership in the American continents, meddled constantly in Asiatic affairs. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that once the negotiations with the United States were underway any understanding resulting from them would receive the full accord of the Japanese government, the army and the navy.[392]

95. Foreign Minister Toyoda Submits Official Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

A few days after Ambassador Nomura had presented Secretary Hull with the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda, although anxious to facilitate negotiations, agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government should avoid making any further proposals until it had received a reply from the United States.[393]

Stating that on July 14, 1941 he had sent some instructions which Ambassador Nomura had never presented to the American officials, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had issued other proposals on September 4, 1941 and September 25, 1941 in which he had attempted to harmonize both documents with the American proposal of June 21, 1941. He had hoped, therefore, that negotiations might be made on the basis of these proposals.

In the event that American officials questioned certain phrases in these latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura concerning their interpretation. The expression "as there is no real objective, we will make no northward invasion" was omitted from the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 because it was feared that the insertion of such a phrase might lead America to suspect that Japan had designs against Soviet Russia.

Since the whole problem evolved from the China Incident and the South Seas' question in the first place, Japan felt that there was no particular problem in the north. With regard to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the matter had been fully discussed in the proposals and that any further clarification could be taken up at the leaders' meeting. In any event, he had no objection to the statement.[394]

[390] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., ii, 651-652.
[391] III, 220.
[392] Ibid.
[393] III, 221.
[394] Ibid.

[86]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since the term "when the proper time comes" had been included in the article discussing the European war, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt that neither country would object to the statement of their respective attitudes. Until the American government broached the subject again, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister desired to postpone discussion of the second clause of the same article.

Concerning the adjustment of the China Incident, the Japanese government was aware of the United States' belief that the settlement of this particular problem was of greatest importance to the stability of the Pacific area. However, if the United States opposed the first clause which indicated that both governments considered it their joint responsibility to bring about peace, Japan was willing to leave it out altogether.

Since Japan, from the beginning of negotiations, had been looking with expectancy to American mediation in the China affair, it had no objection to President Roosevelt's assisting in the settlement. The phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" had been inserted in accordance with the three principles laid down by Prime Minister Konoye, and had no special meaning.[395]

Since the United States might entertain some misgivings about the question of nondiscrimination in Chinese economic activities, Foreign Minister Toyoda offered the assurance that the principle of trade equality would be applied to all other countries. However, in accordance with similar practices existing throughout the world, the geographical situation in the Far East would naturally result in more intimate, neighborly relations between Japan and China. Nevertheless, once the conditions arising from the American freezing order had been ameliorated, commerce between Japan and the United States could be resumed on a normal basis and the Japanese government would be willing to accept the United States' proposals governing trade.

In view of the fact that the stipulations concerning political stability in the Pacific, as set forth in the American proposal, had been strongly supported by Secretary Hull, Foreign Minister Toyoda stressed that Japan would give them full consideration, especially since they were general stipulations. In order to expand the significance of the clause pertaining to the establishment of peace in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Toyoda had embodied therein proposals for the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the China Incident. If the United States did not like this arrangement, Foreign Minister Toyoda was willing to change it.[396]

96. Ambassador Nomura Converses with Admirals Stark and Turner (September 30, 1941)

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Nomura met with Admiral Stark to confer on the Japanese-American situation, and Rear Admiral Turner joined them later. In the opinion of Admiral Stark the stationing of Japanese troops in China was imperiling the present negotiations, and unless the incident was settled without further delay, an understanding between Tokyo and Washington would be impossible.

Although Rear Admiral Turner doubted that Japan would agree to evacuate China completely, he was certain that unless some compromise could be reached in the preparatory discussions, a meeting between the two leaders would be extremely dangerous.

When the discussion turned to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, Admiral Stark stated that the United States would not strike at Japan, since if it fought a two ocean war, it would have to defend itself in the Pacific.[397]

[395] III, 222.
[396] III, 223.
[397] III, 224.

[87]

97. Mr. Iguti Warns Tokyo Against Signs of Over-Anxiety

In the message to Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau in Japan on September 29, 1941, Counselor Iguti warned his government against showing signs of over-anxiety in dealing with the present negotiations.[398] Furthermore, he believed that it was unwise to deliver statements in Washington which were copies of the original already handed to Ambassador Grew, since transmission errors and discrepancies in translation often created unnecessary misunderstandings. Under these circumstances, Ambassador Nomura found it difficult to explain without lengthy explanations vague passages in the document. Another practice of the Japanese Foreign Office, causing confusion and delay, was the constant submission of proposals which seldom ran in sequence.

Information indicated that the United States believed that the Japanese government was shifting the scene of the negotiations to Tokyo in order to delay proceedings so that Japan could watch the development of the Russian-German war and launch a northward move, if conditions were in its favor. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

It was reported to Mr. Iguti that Japanese governmental circles believed that the United States had no reason to refuse the most recent Japanese proposals. They blamed interference in Washington for the inactivity of the United States. However, Mr. Iguti remarked that during the past six months Japanese officials in Washington had clearly indicated the attitude of the United States in their reports to Tokyo. Believing that Tokyo viewed the United States' statements too optimistically, and in fact, with an attitude of almost wishful thinking, Mr. Iguti was certain that the United States had no intention of withdrawing from its position.

By its impatience in urging an immediate reply from the United States, Japan was endangering the situation by giving the impression that the Japanese government was overly anxious to arrive at an understanding. Since the United States had not suffered greatly from any economic measures imposed upon it by Japan, it could afford to delay matters. On the other hand, the American freezing order had affected Japan's entire economic structure. Mr. Iguti believed that under these circumstances, Japan should not show its hand by signs of over-anxiety.[399]

98. Mr. Terasaki Replies to Mr. Iguti

After receiving Mr. Iguti's message concerning Japanese-American relations, and giving it careful consideration, Mr. Terasaki replied that Counselor Iguti's criticisms were justified in regard to the Japanese government's continuing to send proposals after having stated officially that Japan had made its last concession. The Japanese message of September 4, 1941 had been designed to express Japan's views on existing problems in a broad light, and desiring to facilitate negotiations, the Japanese government had sent further messages based upon the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941, which pertained to the garrisoning of troops in China and peace terms for the settlement of the China Incident. Sent at the request of both Prime Minister Konoye and the Japanese military authorities, these supplementary notes were to be used as reference material by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington when explaining Japan's position to the United States government.

[398] III, 225.
[399] Ibid.

[88]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Officials in Tokyo had been quite unaware that Ambassador Nomura had submitted a statement of his own on September 4, 1941 until certain questions concerning it were raised by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. Although the Japanese Ambassador had submitted the note only as an unofficial draft, it had complicated negotiations exceedingly. However, Mr. Terasaki realized that Ambassador Nomura and Counselor Iguti were exercising every effort to bring about a satisfactory understanding, and regretted only that the United States did not reciprocate this exhibition of Japanese statesmanship.

Nevertheless, there were more among the Japanese officials who, underestimating the United States, viewed the present condition with undue optimism. In fact, Mr. Terasaki felt that Japanese officials in Washington did not fully appreciate the critical domestic conditions existing in Japan itself. Only by the clear thinking of the military officials in Tokyo had an outbreak been averted following the celebration of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941.[400]

Mr. Terasaki suggested that Counselor Iguti obtain a full description of Japan's internal situation from Minister Wakasugi upon his return to the United States. Furthermore, an explanation should be made to the United States along the lines that certain officials in the United States, misunderstanding the political situation in Japan, did not appreciate the strength of Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet, and believed consequently that an agreement concluded by the Japanese government would be disregarded by the military organization.

Mr. Terasaki emphasized that though there did exist a faction opposed to the present Cabinet, it would be easily overruled by those in favor of Prime Minister Konoye. It was true that Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Mr. Nakano's speech were opposed to Prime Minister Konoye's message, but Mr. Terasaki felt that anyone cognizant of the characteristics of the Japanese people and familiar with conditions in Japan would be able to evaluate those speeches properly. British and American newspapermen, concerned primarily with "journalistic interests", exaggerated minor points in the speech, thereby causing grave misunderstanding.

According to Mr. Terasaki, if the situation were properly explained to American officials, they would understand the real picture. In view of domestic circumstances and external conditions, it was evident that Japan was eager to have a leaders' conference take place. If American officials chose to construe this Japanese attitude as impatience, nothing could be done about it.

Japan agreed that Washington was to be the central locale of any negotiations conducted, though an occasion might arise when conversations would be conducted in Tokyo first. Anyone who construed such action as a delay on the part of the Japanese government misunderstood Foreign Minister Toyoda's intentions.

Time, in Japan's opinion, was now the most important element, for the materialization of the present negotiations would have an important bearing on peace not only in the Pacific but also throughout the world. Thus, the seriousness of the situation was obvious. If the United States so wished, Japan was willing to negotiate further on the basis of its recent message which contained its final efforts to persuade the United States to agree to a leaders' conference.[401]

99. Tokyo Denies Rumors of Dissension in Konoye Cabinet

Special Japanese intelligence reports from New York had revealed that America still regarded the negotiations with Japan from a pessimistic standpoint and that rumors were circulating that Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet inevitably would be forced to undergo a revision within two weeks.[402] Tokyo denied this rumor and urged that American officials be enlightened with regard to the true situation.

[400] III, 226.
[401] Ibid.
[402] III, 227.

[89]

When answering Secretary Hull's questions on the attitude of Japanese public opinion toward negotiations with America, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Nomura give full assurance that public opinion was calm. The Japanese government was becoming increasingly conscious of the need to issue a statement on the negotiations at the earliest opportunity.[403] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

100. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 2, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[404]

On October 2, 1941 when Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment, he was presented with a confidential statement expressing the views of the United States toward the Japanese proposals.[405]

It declared that after a careful study of the proposals submitted to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 and all statements subsequently communicated to America by Japan, the United States had arrived at certain conclusions.

Welcoming an opportunity to further the broad objectives and principles of peace, the United States had received Japan's suggestion, made through Ambassador Nomura during the early part of August 1941, that a meeting be held by the responsible heads of both governments in order to discuss the adjustment of existing relations. Furthermore, the suggestion had been carefully considered that the informal conversations be resumed in order to ascertain a basis for a peaceful program covering the entire Pacific situation.

As a result, on August 17, 1941, President Roosevelt in a reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the view that the United States was prepared to consider the resumption of exploratory discussions provided that they envisaged the conclusion of a progressive program by peaceful means, an equality of commercial opportunity and treatment throughout the entire Pacific area, and the making of raw materials and other essential commodities accessible to all countries. Japan would profit from the adoption of such a program. Provided that the Japanese government agreed to a peaceful program in the Pacific and adhered to the principles to which the United States was committed, the American government would endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place for the exchange of views.

It was gratifying to both President Roosevelt and the United States to receive a message from Prime Minister Konoye and a statement from Japan on August 28, 1941, expressing Japan's intention to pursue a peaceful course in harmony with the broad purpose and fundamental principles to which the United States was committed. Supporting the program outlined by President Roosevelt as applicable not only to the Pacific area but to the entire world, the Japanese government gave further assurance that it would exert no military force against any neighboring nation without provocation.

While anxious not to delay arrangements for the proposed meeting between the two government leaders by a discussion of minor details, the United States, nevertheless, felt it advisable to clarify the interpretation of certain principles in order to ensure the achievement of all objectives. In replying to Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941, President Roosevelt agreed to collaborate with the Japanese government in supporting the four principles, previously mentioned by the United States, upon which relations between the two nations must properly rest:-

[403] Ibid.
[404] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 2, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.
[405] Ibid.

[90]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

Pointing out the necessity of reaching a community of view with respect to the fundamental differences revealed during the informal conversations, President Roosevelt had requested an indication of Japan's attitude toward the fundamental principles and in a conversation with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, Prime Minister Konoye on September 6, 1941 had subscribed fully to the four principles mentioned above.

In view of the foregoing developments and assurances, coupled with other statements made by the Japanese government, the United States had been assured of Japan's intention to give practical application to the broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area.

When the proposal extended by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 had disclosed divergencies in the concepts of the two governments, the United States was gravely disappointed. While they were apparently intended as a concrete basis for discussions, those Japanese proposals and the subsequent explanatory statement narrowed and restricted the application of the basic principles regarding the establishment and maintenance of peaceful stability throughout the entire Pacific area. Because of previous broad assurances given by the Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese government, the United States did not understand the need for Japan's modifying its former commitments with unnecessary qualifying phrases.

Although recognizing the inalienable right of any nation to defend itself from aggression, the United States found it difficult to conceive of any circumstances developing in the territory of French Indo-China, in Thailand or in Soviet Russia which would constitute a threat or provocation to Japan.

Although a formula of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations had been set down as the fundamental economic policy of the two governments, the proposals of September 6, 1941 and subsequent communications from the Japanese government restricted the commitments contained in that economic agreement to countries of the Southwest Pacific area. In spite of assurances that it would respect the principle of nondiscrimination in China, the explanation given by the Japanese government implied that it intended to limit this principle by reason of geographical propinquity to China.[406]

Peace would not be achieved if either government could pursue one course or policy in a certain area at the same time that it followed an opposing policy in another area. In the views expressed by the Japanese government relating to the question of China, the United States noticed a determination to station Japanese forces in certain areas of China for an indeterminate period. Such a procedure seemed to be out of keeping with the progressive principles discussed in the informal conversations. The United States could not agree with the reasons laid down by Japan for continuing its military occupation of China and it felt that such action would endanger any prospects of stability.

In order to give full assurance of its peaceful intentions and desire to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area, the United States believed that Japan should exhibit a clear-cut manifestation of its intention to withdraw Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

[406] "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), October 2, 1941, S.D., II 656-661. For English text wired to Foreign Minister Toyoda by Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941, see III, 228-239.

[91]

music 4.mus.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

A parody of VH1's Behind the Music series, this show combined a slew of live-action interview segments with actual rock stars amongst cartoon clips of Chef as he discusses his career and with some clips from Chef Aid.

analyzing breath 6lj.0561 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Scientists would like to take your breath away. Literally.

Exhaled vapor holds clues to your health, revealing much more than just what you ate for lunch. In recent years, researchers have been scrutinizing the misty mixture of molecules with fervor, seeking evidence of conditions ranging from sleep apnea to cancer.

Breath can also reveal exposure to pollutants such as benzene and chloroform, providing a measure of internal dose that is missed by sampling polluted air.

“The lung is a soggy mess of tubes and sacs whose job is to exchange gases from blood into breath,” says Joachim D. Pleil, an analytical chemist and environmental health scientist with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “The breath is a window into the blood.”

Collecting and analyzing breath is emerging as a kinder, gentler means for surveying the body, a complement to old standbys such as blood and urine tests, or invasive techniques that irritate the lungs, says Pleil, who reviews the role of exhaled breath analysis in an upcoming issue of the Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part B.

“You might have a 90-year-old man on a respirator, and it’s hard to tap a vein,” he says. “Or an 800-gram infant who doesn’t make enough urine in a week to analyze. That infant is always breathing.”

Even the ancients knew that there’s more to breath than meets the eye. Doctors have been sniffing breath for indications of disease since Hippocrates’ day. The sweet smell of acetone is a flag for diabetes, and advanced liver disease is said to make the breath reek of fish. Breath is 99 percent water, but roughly 3,000 other compounds have been detected in human breath—the average sample contains at least 200. There are also bits of DNA, proteins, and fats floating in the mist. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

gradually h.g.0 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).http://Louis-J-Sheehan.biz

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI-(North Wind cloudy).

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE-(West Wind clear).



gradually

phermones 7.phe.001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Fear stinks. And its stench tickles a recently re-discovered set of nerves in the tip of a mouse’s nose.

Swiss researchers report in the Aug. 22 Science that they have finally found a function for a structure called the Grueneberg ganglion. The structure, composed of about 500 neurons, is an alarm pheromone sensor, say Marie-Christine Broillet, a neurophysiologist at the University of Lausanne, and her colleagues. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

“It’s an interesting paper and something the field has been waiting for, to know what these cells are doing,” comments Minghong Ma, a neuroscientist at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine in Philadelphia.

Alarm pheromones are mysterious substances given off by animals under stress. The chemicals — no one really knows exactly what mammalian alarm pheromones look like — signal other members of a species that something bad is happening. Animals typically respond to the signals by running away, freezing (so predators won’t notice them) or attacking, Broillet says.

Researchers have yet to identify the source of the alarm pheromones in mammals and until now had no idea how mice, humans and other animals detected chemical fear cues.

First described in 1973, the Grueneberg ganglion was largely forgotten until a few years ago when mice were genetically engineered to produce a green fluorescent protein in their neurons, Broillet says.

Scientists were surprised to see the clusters of green neurons sitting all alone at the tip of the mice’s noses. The Grueneberg ganglion sends long projections, called axons, to the brain’s scent-processing center. But the ganglion is separate from other odor and pheromone-sensing structures and its function was unknown.

The structure is fully developed at birth, so some researchers believe it is involved in helping mothers and pups recognize each other. But the new study found that neurons in the ganglion don’t respond to milk or other mammary secretions. The neurons are also oblivious to odors, known mouse pheromones, urine, temperature, pressure and acidity.

Because the Grueneberg ganglion didn’t respond to anything the team tried, the researchers decided to look at its structure instead.

“We learned a lot from the electron microscopy,” Broillet says. The neurons in the Grueneberg ganglion are covered with skin, have cilia — fingerlike projections often found on scent-detecting cells — and are wrapped with support cells called glia. The skin and wrappings shield the cells from direct contact with irritants.

“It’s a dangerous world out there,” says Charles Derby, a chemical ecologist and neuroscientist at Georgia State University in Atlanta, who studies chemical sensing in spiny lobsters. “You need your sensors out there interacting with the environment, but you also need protection.”

Such protective measures mean the cells probably detect volatile, water-soluble substances that can pass through the protective barrier. Alarm pheromones fit the bill. The Swiss researchers collected alarm cues from mice dying of carbon dioxide poisoning. Those alarm chemicals sparked activity in Grueneberg ganglion cells, and affected other mice’s behavior. Normal mice ran away from a tray of water containing the alarm pheromones and froze in the corner. Mice that had surgery to remove the ganglion continued exploring as if they were blind to the smell of fear, but had no trouble locating an Oreo cookie hidden in bedding.

Not everyone is convinced that the Grueneberg ganglion actually detects alarm pheromones.

“I don’t think that their ‘alarm pheromone’ is a pheromone,” says Yasushi Kiyokawa, a veterinary researcher at the University of Tokoyo who studies alarm pheromones in rats. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The signal could be a non-specific odor given off by dead and dying animals. “However, I am convinced that this organ detects some aversive odor in mice.”

Humans have a Grueneberg ganglion. But other structures that humans and rodents share detect pheromones and odors for rodents, but don’t work in people, Ma says. Rodents are visually challenged so they rely on their sense of smell. But humans have language. “We probably yell out instead of waiting for a chemical signal,” she says.

save 9.sav.0982 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Treating HIV earlier can increase a patient’s survival chances, a new study of more than 8,000 HIV patients shows. The findings suggest doctors should rethink the standard practice of HIV treatment, a team reports at a meeting of microbiologists and infectious disease researchers.

HIV depletes key immune cells called CD4 T cells. A patient’s T cell count, the concentration of CD4 cells still in circulation, is used to gauge how far the virus that causes AIDS has progressed and to determine when to treat a patient with the frontline drug cocktail for HIV. The standard benchmark for initiating this treatment has been a T cell count of 200 cells per cubic millimeter of blood.

A new study presented by physician and HIV/AIDS specialist Mari Kitahata of the University of Washington in Seattle suggests that the cut-off point should be placed much sooner, at only 500. This benchmark, presented October 26 in Washington, D.C., during the combined meeting of the Infectious Diseases Society of America and the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy, goes even farther than a recommendation in the Aug. 6 Journal of the American Medical Association to start intensive treatment when the T cell count drops to only 350.

Before newer HIV drugs were on the market, doctors often delayed treatment. This was not only because of cost, but also because of the serious side effects from the drugs available at the time and the fear that patients’ failure to stick to the large and onerous daily drug regimen would create drug-resistant HIV, says physician Daniel Kuritzkes of Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. In recent years, though, newer drugs have become available that require fewer daily doses and have less harmful side effects — leading many doctors to reconsider the threshold for beginning treatment.

Kitahata and her colleagues analyzed data from 22 studies of people from Canada and the United States who started the cocktail of HIV therapies between 1996 and 2006 — surveying more than 8,000 HIV patients. By tracking people from entry into the study until either the patients died or the study they were in ended, the researchers could assess whether beginning treatment earlier improved patients’ survival.

The study compared 5,901 patients who followed more standard treatment guidelines and did not begin treatment until CD4 counts were below 350, to 2,473 patients who began treatment when their CD4 counts were between 351 and 500. The data showed that patients who delayed treatment until their T cell count was below 350 faced a 70 percent higher risk of death than patients who started treatment earlier.

This new study provides the largest source of data for comparing different starting times of HIV treatment.

For reasons including lack of access to medical care, many patients who have CD4 counts that are low may not receive treatment, according to Kitahata. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire “That does not reflect our willingness to treat people,” she says.

Across North America the average patient starts treatment for HIV with a CD4 count of 300, “which means fully half of people [starting treatment] are below that,” says Richard Moore, of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, and the principal investigator on the large-scale study. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

Kuritzkes says changing the starting point of treatment could save several hundred thousand lives in the United States. “What I think is likely to happen is that as we push the threshold for starting therapy sooner and sooner we’ll get better at identifying high-risk cases … to fine-tune who gets treated earliest and who can wait a little longer,” he says.

green 9.gre.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

For more than a decade, study after study has extolled the cancer-fighting virtues of green tea, or at least extracts of its polyphenol antioxidants. But preliminary data now suggest that for some people this herbal remedy may not prove beneficial — or even benign. In test-tube experiments on cancer cells and in animals, green tea’s polyphenols inactivated the cell-killing activity of a drug used to treat blood cancers.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Physicians prescribe bortezomib, a drug sold under the trade name Velcade, to patients with multiple myeloma. This treatable, though incurable, cancer begins in antibody-producing white blood cells. As the abnormal cells replicate and build within bone marrow, they risk damaging the bone itself. Once this disease spreads to marrow-producing tissue at several sites in the body, it’s termed multiple myeloma. Infections, liver failure and death can result.

Bortezomib is also approved for treatment of mantle cell lymphoma, a rare and hard-to-cure form of non-Hodgkin's disease.

Buoyed by all of the benefits ascribed to green-tea polyphenols — particularly (-)-epigallocatechin gallate, better known as EGCG — a Los Angeles-based team of researchers decided to treat multiple myeloma with bortezomib in combination with various green-tea polyphenols, especially EGCG. The pharmacologists had anticipated the drug-tea duo would dramatically outperform use of bortezomib alone. In fact, the pairing totally shut down the drug’s anticancer activity.

The findings appear in Blood, a journal of the American Society of Hematology, which published the new green-tea paper early online, this week, ahead of print.

That EGCG “blocked the therapeutic action of Velcade was completely unexpected,” according to team leader Axel H. Schönthal of the University of Southern California School of Medicine.

As a so-called proteasome inhibitor, bortezomib deactivates proteasomes —large protein complexes that help destroy cellular proteins that have outlived their usefulness. In the test-tube and in mice, EGCG and its polyphenolic kin blocked the cancer drug’s proteasome inhibition. A key constitutent of the drug is boron. And that’s proved interesting, Schönthal’s team notes, because they observed no green-tea inactivation of cancer-fighting proteasome inhibitors that lack boron.

Other dietary constituents — most notably vitamin C and iron — can also poison the activity of bortezomib, but only at concentrations 100-fold higher than EGCG requires. In fact, EGCG concentrations needed to turn off the drug’s anticancer activity in the latest study “can easily be achieved [in people] after the ingestion of capsules containing green-tea extract,” Schönthal and his colleagues report. “We therefore have no doubt that our discovery is highly relevant for clinical considerations.”

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire “The most immediate conclusion,” Schönthal says, is that “patients undergoing cancer therapy with Velcade must avoid green tea, and in particular all of its concentrated [polyphenol extracts]" that are so readily available in health-food stores and online.

Adding to Schönthal’s concerns: Green-tea supplements may provide symptomatic relief for some patients treated with bortezomib — precisely because the tea constituents are turning off the cell-poisoning activity responsible for triggering side effects.

But don’t look for a simple message in this research, such as that green tea is bad for chemotherapy patients. In a separate study using another “well-established chemotherapeutic drug” — one that Schönthal won’t yet name — “inclusion of EGCG appears to yield an ‘encouragingly beneficial’ outcome.”Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation provided funding for the new study